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Cornhusker Economics
“The Only Thing That Is Constant Is Change”:

A Brief Overview on How Technology Has Changed Futures Markets
Part II
Market Report
Livestock and Products,
Weekly Average
Nebraska Slaughter Steers,
35-65% Choice, Live Weight. . . . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers,
Med. & Large Frame, 550-600 lb. . . . .
Nebraska Feeder Steers,
Med. & Large Frame 750-800 lb. . .. .
Choice Boxed Beef,
600-750 lb. Carcass. . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Western Corn Belt Base Hog Price
Carcass, Negotiated. . . . . . . . . . . . . ..
Pork Carcass Cutout, 185 lb. Carcass
51-52% Lean. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Slaughter Lambs, wooled and shorn,
135-165 lb. National. . . . . . .
National Carcass Lamb Cutout
FOB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Crops,
Daily Spot Prices
Wheat, No. 1, H.W.
Imperial, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corn, No. 2, Yellow
Nebraska City, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Soybeans, No. 1, Yellow
Nebraska City, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . .
Grain Sorghum, No.2, Yellow
Dorchester, cwt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Oats, No. 2, Heavy
Minneapolis, Mn, bu. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Feed
Alfalfa, Large Square Bales,
Good to Premium, RFV 160-185
Northeast Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . .
Alfalfa, Large Rounds, Good
Platte Valley, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Grass Hay, Large Rounds, Good
Nebraska, ton. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . .
Dried Distillers Grains, 10% Moisture
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Wet Distillers Grains, 65-70% Moisture
Nebraska Average. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
⃰ No Market

Year
Ago

4 Wks
Ago

10-31-15

167.85

117.28

138.14

283.77

213.50

220.29

246.67

192.97

200.83

251.79

208.44

219.22

86.31

71.24

60.77

98.02

84.59

81.94

164.50

155.04

156.73

377.27

359.40

357.69

5.21

4.27

4.14

3.29

3.54

3.52

9.68

8.07

8.26

6.34

6.00

5.93

3.42

2.45

2.60

215.00

180.00

185.00

85.00

75.00

75.00

85.00

80.00

77.50

112.50

125.00

112.50

43.00

50.00

49.50

In our previous Cornhusker Economics
(10/28/2015) we talked about the emergence of
electronic trading in futures markets and new
trading practices that came with it. In particular,
we discussed spoofing and mentioned the trial
in Chicago of a trader accused of “spoofing”
commodity futures markets. As I write this article, a “breaking news” alert, pops up on my
computer screen which informs me that the trial
is over and the jury has just reached a verdict. As
the Financial Times reports, the trader was
found guilty on 12 accounts, “including intending to defraud other traders by flooding gold,
corn, soybeans, foreign exchange and crude oil
futures markets with small orders with the intent of cancelling them” (i.e. spoofing).
Throughout the trial in Chicago, some interesting points emerged during the arguments from
the prosecutor and defense attorneys. The first
one was that it is not easy to prove that any given trader is really spoofing the market. Indeed,
this implies proving that orders were intentionally placed to be cancelled before execution.
Without records showing this kind of intention,
it is not always easy to prove it. A typical line of
defense is that the trader actually intended to
execute all the orders, and that fast order cancellations are a normal and legitimate practice in
the new world of high-frequency trading (HFT).
In fact, there is nothing new about cancelling
orders; traders have done that since the beginning of trading times. In the environment of
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electronic trading and HFT, order cancellations become anonymous and much faster (within seconds or
even milliseconds), but it can still be a legitimate trading practice. Just to be clear, cancelling orders is not
prohibited or illegal; the problem is placing and cancelling them with the intention to mislead other traders and profit from that.
Further, according to the Chicago Tribune, the defendant argued that he was not spoofing the market,
but rather trying to “create a lopsided market that encouraged other participants to enter the market so he
could act as a market maker and profit legitimately
from the spread between the lowest selling price and
the highest buying price.” Regardless of the merit of
his claim, that brings us to the role of a market maker
in futures markets. Market makers are common players in financial markets in general, and their function
is to provide liquidity to the market. Market makers
are always ready to buy or sell, and they are constantly
posting bid and ask prices for each commodity (or
asset) they trade. The bid represents the price at which
they agree to buy and the ask represents the price at
which they agree to sell.
Market makers are typically trading all the time. If
they use futures contracts to buy corn from you at
their bid price, they want to turn around and sell that
corn to somebody else at their ask price (and viceversa). They offer a service to the market by providing
liquidity, and the difference between their bid and ask
(the bid-ask spread) represents how much they charge
for this service. The bid-ask spread reflects how much
market makers believe they need to charge in order to
make a profit from their liquidity-providing job. In
markets with larger number of participants, it is easier
to find buyers and sellers and hence market makers
typically lower their bid-ask spread. In other words, in
more liquid markets, it is easier to get in and out of
the market and market makers charge less for their
service, hence it is “cheaper” to trade.
Has the larger liquidity that emerged with electronic
trading reduced trading costs? Unfortunately, the answer to this question is not so simple. Several studies
have investigated the bid-ask spread (our measure of
trading costs) before and after the adoption of electronic trading, and during different periods since electronic trading started. In general, results suggest that

bid-ask spreads have been reduced. Proponents of
electronic trading and HFT often claim that the
new trading systems provide more liquidity to
markets, which leads to more accurate prices and
lower trading costs. This has been the main “line of
defense” for electronic trading and HFT.

However, the story does not end here. Critics argue
that there are studies that find contrasting results,
i.e. bid-ask spreads may have risen in some markets. In addition, bid-ask spreads may have narrowed on average, but there are also concerns
about the quality of the liquidity that allowed for
narrower spreads. Automated or algorithmic trading have created a much larger trading volume, but
they have also disrupted trading at least a few
times. There have been reports of some events in
which market prices swung dramatically within a
few minutes, affecting the accuracy of market prices and creating more risk for market participants
(such as the “flash crash” of May 6, 2010). Those
events were likely caused by improper execution of
trading orders, such as traders accidentally hitting
the “wrong button” on their computers or automated systems malfunctioning. During these disruptions, the market becomes more volatile, which
increases the risk for open positions in the market.
This can trigger built-in controls in automated systems, leading them to offset their positions and
thus making those price swings even wilder. Another issue observed in those events is that some
HFT firms seem to have reduced or paused their
trading for a while, which implies that the market
would abruptly become less liquid when it actually
needed that liquidity the most. It would suddenly
become harder for traders to get out of the market
during those volatile periods.
Problems with order execution are certainly not
new, but in the current environment with larger
and faster orders, they can potentially lead to larger
and faster disruptions. Critics argue that current
trading systems lack human judgement. Machines
just follow a pre-determined set of orders and do
not have the capacity to judge when they should or
should not be executed (some people have actually
been trying to develop trading systems based on
artificial intelligence, but this is a topic for another
discussion). When things go wrong, and they now

can go wrong very fast, the consequences may be dramatic until somebody has time to understand what is
happening and figure out how to stop it.
In principle, electronic trading has brought benefits to
the market. However, it is not completely clear whether those benefits are always present or they outweigh
potential disruptions caused by new trading systems
and strategies. Either way, the futures market is not
going back to the open outcry system in the pits. Electronic trading is here to stay. In reality, the increasingly large volume of futures contracts can only be handled by computers. The question we need to debate is
not whether we should have electronic trading, but
rather how we want to shape it.
During last month’s trial, the Chicago Tribune reported an interesting argument. According to the prosecutor, a large chicken producer “was frustrated in its
efforts to buy corn futures” due to the spoofing practices that disrupted the corn futures market. The defense attorney argued that “that’s on them – they
should have invested in algorithms”, suggesting the
chicken producer was to blame for not keeping up
with modern trading practices. It is questionable
whether this particular argument makes sense, but it
makes me think about a more general question: since
all trading in futures markets is now electronic, and a
large (and perhaps increasingly larger) portion of it
happens faster than human traders can handle, are we
moving towards a predominantly automated trading
world? If so, is this really beneficial for market participants?
The above point related to the chicken producer trying
to hedge the price of corn also reminds us of the very
basic nature of futures markets. They were developd to
provide risk management opportunities and price discovery tools for the industry, i.e. to facilitate trading in
the commercial world. Speculators were attracted to
those markets looking to make profits, and the added
liquidity provided by them was and still is welcome. As
we discussed before, more liquid markets have several
advantages and tend to make it easier for commercial
traders to use futures markets for risk management
and price discovery. However, it now remains to be
further debated whether potential disruptions generated by recent developments in trading systems may
outweigh the benefits of the larger liquidity provided

by those systems. Currently, it appears we do not
have a clear answer to these questions. More and
better data, along with more research, are needed
in order to properly address these points.
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